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FEDERAL RULE Of EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E): ADMISSIBILITY
OF STATEMENTS FROM AN UNCHARGED CONSPIRACY
THAT DOES NOT UNDERLIE THE SUBSTANTIVE CHARGE
INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E) is the modern codification of
the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.' For a statement,
otherwise hearsay, to be admissible under the exception, the statement must be "offered against a party and . .. [be] a statement
[made] by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." '2 The conspiracy that serves as the basis of

1. United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 130 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1179 (E.D. Pa.
1981). The legislative history makes clear that the exception predates the Rule. See S.
Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 7051, 7073; Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note. Technically,
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) is not an exception to the hearsay rule, but instead defines
coconspirator statements as "not hearsay." The Rule is still referred to as the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d
871, 880 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kiefer, 694 F.2d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir.
1982); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 815 (1983); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 930 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d
1184, 1189 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979). This terminology will be
used throughout this Note.
2. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). A statement is made during the course of a
conspiracy when it is made after the conspiracy's formation and before the conspiracy's termination. A conspiracy is terminated when its "central criminal purposes"
have been accomplished. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1957);
accord United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, "a
sudsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence
showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators took
care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment." Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402; accord Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44
(1949).
A statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy when it is made "to advance
the aims of the alledged conspiracy." United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520
(9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); accord United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 550 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490,
494-95 (2d Cir. 1964). It is not necessary that the statements actually further the
goals of the conspiracy provided that was their intended effect. United States v.
Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 753 (1983).
"[M]erely narrative declarations" by a coconspirator concerning conspiracy activities
or culpability are not considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States
v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see United States v.
Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981) ("mere idle conversation . . .is not
admissible"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Lieberman, 637
F.2d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1980) ("idle chatter" not in furtherance of the conspiracy).
However, statements made to "prospective co-conspirators for membership purposes
are ... in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252,
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admissibility need not be charged in the indictment. 3 An underlying
conspiracy--an uncharged conspiracy to commit the substantive
crime charged-may serve as the basis of admissibility. 4 Whether a
collateral conspiracy-an uncharged conspiracy that does not underlie a substantive charge-can serve as the basis of admissibility is an
issue that only recently has come before the federal courts and is as yet

unresolved. 5

A typical scenario in which a collateral conspiracy issue might arise
is as follows:" The defendant is a member of a second conspiracy in

1256-57 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1236 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1981); accord United States v. Jackson,
549 F.2d 517, 534 (8th Cir.) (statements made for the purpose of inducing another to
join the conspiracy are in furtherance of the conspiracy), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985
(1977).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Durland, 575 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 1978);

United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 477 F.2d 1280, 1283
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 843 (1973); United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d
642, 645 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 267, at 646 (2d ed. 1972); 4 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-166 (1979).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The cases establishing that uncharged conspiracies may provide the basis of admissibility, with very few exceptions, dealt with underlying conspiracies. See United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp.
903, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds, 720 F.2d 548
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); see, e.g., United States v.
Durland, 575 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d
623, 627 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United
States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976);
United States v. Richardson, 477 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
843 (1973).
5. Compare United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770 (10th Cir. 1975) (the
coconspirator exception applies to uncharged conspiracy even though it does not
underlie substantive charge) with United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 918
(N.D. Cal. 1982) ("the [coconspirator] exception should be confined to the conspiracy charged or underlying the substantive charge"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984). In
United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 940 (1980), the Second Circuit addressed the collateral conspiracy issue in
dictum. Id. at 635 n.25. The court expressed a preference for "the narrower construction of the rule," which limits the coconspirator exception to charged and underlying
conspiracies. Id. at 636 n.25.
6. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770 (10th Cir. 1975) (defendant
and declarant were members of collateral drug conspiracy; statements by declarant
in furtherance of drug conspiracy offered against defendant to prove murder and
murder conspiracy); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 916 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (defendant and declarant were members of collateral concealment conspiracy;
statements by declarant in furtherance of concealment conspiracy offered to prove
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addition to the charged or underlying conspiracy. One of the defendant's coconspirators in this collateral conspiracy makes a statement,
during the course and in furtherance of the collateral conspiracy, that
is relevant to the prosecution's case against the defendant. The prosecutor seeks to admit this statement against the defendant.
If the declarant is also a member of the charged or underlying
conspiracy, the prosecutor may argue that the statement was also
made during the course and in furtherance of that conspiracy. If this

is established, the statement meets the requirements of the coconspirator exception and is admissible without further analysis. 7 If, however,
the declarant is not a member of the charged or underlying conspiracy, or the prosecutor cannot make the required showing, the prosecutor must establish a different basis for admitting the evidence. Some
prosecutors have argued for a broad construction of the coconspirator

exception that would allow collateral conspiracies to serve as the basis
of admissibility."
This Note argues that both construction and policy suggest that the
extension of this exception to include collateral conspiracies is illadvised. Although a broad construction of the exception may provide
a useful tool for prosecutors,9 it poses serious dangers to criminal
defendants. The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is inherently a one-way exception. It allows the prosecution to admit poten-

murder and murder conspiracy). aff'd in part. rev'd in part on other grounds, 720
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3631 (Feb. 24, 1984)
7. See, e.g., United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United
States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1236 n.7 (1981). Admissibility
in this context refers to satisfaction of the requirements of the coconspirator exception. Before a statement can be admitted in a criminal trial, it also must satisfy the
requirements of the confrontation clause. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980);
U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court in Roberts laid down a two-part test to
determine whether a hearsay statement is admissible under the confrontation clause.
448 U.S. at 65-66. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770 (10th Cir. 1975); see United
States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on othergrounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
9. See United States v. DeRoche, No. 83-2250, slip op. at 2459 (5th Cir. Feb.
24, 1984); Klein, Conspiracy- The Prosecutor'sDarling, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 9
(1957); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators'
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1159-60 (1954). A broad
construction expands the exception and thereby expands its usefulness to the prosecutor. He can admit coconspirator statements merely by showing they were made
during the course and in furtherance of any conspiracy in which the defendant and
declarant are members. See infra pt. I(B)(1). He is not limited to charged or underlying conspiracies.
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tially unreliable statements 10 against a conspirator-defendant, but
does not permit the defendant to admit such statements on his behalf." A broad construction further unbalances this one-sided exception by vitiating the statutory limitations on the scope of the excep-

tion. 12 A new group of potentially unreliable statements, which may
be only remotely connected to the issues at trial,' 3 becomes admissible
against the defendant.
Part I of this Note analyzes the collateral conspiracy issue in light of
the theoretical foundations of the coconspirator exception. This part
concludes that a narrow construction is the inevitable result of a
proper understanding of the rationales underlying the exception. Part
II discusses the policies pertinent to interpretation of the exception

and concludes that both evidentiary and constitutional policies militate against extending the coconspirator exception to include collateral
conspiracies.
I.

THE FOUNDATIONS

OF THE COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION AND THEIR

APPLICATION TO COLLATERAL CONSPIRACIES

Hearsay, an out-of-court statement offered for its truth,' 4 is inadmissible unless it comes within an enumerated exception to the hear10. See C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 262, at 628-29; 4 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-170 to -171; Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in Criminal Prosecutions: A
FunctionalAnalysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1384 (1972); Levie, supra note 9, at
1165; Morgan, The Rationaleof VicariousAdmissions, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 461, 470-71
(1929) [hereinafter cited as Morgan I].
11. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) specifically provides that, to be admissible, a coconspirator statement must be "offered against a party." In criminal trials, therefore,
only the prosecutor will have the opportunity to offer coconspirator statements.
12. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
13. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770 (10th Cir. 1975) (statements
by murder victim in furtherance of drug conspiracy offered in murder trial); United
States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (statements in furtherance
of conspiracy to cover up broad range of illicit activities offered in trial of discrete
murder conspiracy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1423 (1984). Collateral or remote evidence is
often less probative of the issues at trial. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 279
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); Corey v. United States, 346 F.2d
65, 67 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965); United States v. Wilson, 490 F.
Supp. 713, 719 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 639 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 942 (1981); Dolan, Rule 403: The PrejudiceRule in Evidence, 49 S.Cal. L.
Rev. 220, 264-65 (1975). See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
14. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219
(1974) ("[o]ut-of-court statements constitute hearsay ...when offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted"); C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 246, at 584
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say rule. 15 This rule was formulated because there is no judicial check
on the reliability of hearsay statements;' 6 such statements are not
made under oath or in the presence of the trier of fact and, most
importantly, are not subject to cross-examination.' 7 Each exception to
the hearsay rule encompasses a class of statements that is deemed
worthy of admission despite the absence of these guarantors of reliability. I
Most exceptions to the hearsay rule are premised at least in part on
the inherent reliability of the out-of-court statements admitted by the

("Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made
out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter."); 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1361, at 2 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)
(hearsay is an "assertion of B reported by A... as evidence of the event X, asserted
by B to have occurred") [hereinafter cited as J. Wigmore I].
15. Fed. R. Evid. 802 provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules ...." Exceptions to the hearsay rule are set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 803,
804(b). Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) exempts certain categories of statements-including
coconspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)-from the definition of'hearsay.
See supra note 1.
16. See R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 334-37
(1977); C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 245, at 581-84; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 179 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Morgan II]; Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule
and Admissions, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 484, 486 (1937).
17. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note. The lack of these in-court
guarantors of reliability is the rationale underlying the hearsay rule. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970); United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354, 1358 n.6
(5th Cir. 1978); see United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The modem emphasis is on the need for cross-examination. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII
advisory committee note; 5 J. Wigmore I, supra note 14, § 1362, at 10; see Morgan,
Hearsay and Non-Hearsay,48 Harv. L. Rev. 1138, 1138 (1935); Strahorn, supranote
16, at 500. These guarantors are necessary for a proper evaluation of testimony:
The factors to be considered in evaluating the testimony of [any] witness are
perception, memory, and narration .... In order to encourage the witness
to do his best with respect to each of these factors, and to expose any
inaccuracies which may enter in, the Anglo-American tradition has evolved
three conditions under which witnesses will ideally be required to testify:
(1) under oath, (2) in the personal presence of the trier of fact, (3) subject to
cross-examination.
Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note; accord R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg,
supra note 16, at 333-35; C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 245, at 581-82; Morgan II,
supra note 16, at 177-79; Strahorn, supra note 16, at 486.
18. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note ("Common sense tells that
much evidence which is not given under the three conditions may be inherently
superior to much that is."); see R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 364; C.
McCormick, supra note 3, § 245, at 583-84; 5 J. Wigmore I, supranote 14, § 1420, at
251.
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exception.' 9 The admission exceptions of Rule 801(d)(2),20 which in-

clude the coconspirator exception, generally are not rationalized on
21
this basis.

A. The Foundationsof the CoconspiratorException
Historically, three rationales have been advanced to support the
coconspirator exception: (1) the trustworthiness rationale-a coconspirator's statements are inherently reliable;22 (2) the criminal agency

19. See R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 364; C. McCormick, supra
note 3, § 245, at 583-84; 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 800[02], at 80011; 5 J. Wigmore I, supra note 14, §§ 1420-1422. Professor Wigmore maintains that
two considerations support all the hearsay exceptions: (1) a "necessity for the evidence"; and (2) a "circumstantial probability of trustworthiness." 5 J. Wigmore I,
supra note 14, § 1420, at 251. The necessity for the evidence can arise either from the
declarant's unavailability as a witness or the nature of the evidence itself. Id. at 253.
Exceptions enumerated in Fed. R. Evid. 803 apparently are premised primarily on
the theory that the statements they encompass are reliable. Statements within Rule
803 "possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available." Fed.
R. Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Exceptions enumerated within Rule 804(b)
apparently are premised on a combination of reliability and necessity. These statements are admissible only if "the declarant is unavailable as a witness." Fed. R. Evid.
804(b).
20. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party
and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make
a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
21. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee
followed the generally held belief that admissions are not excluded from the operation of the hearsay rule because of their trustworthiness. See, e.g., R. Lempert & S.
Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 365; C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 262, at 628-29; E.
Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 266 (1962); Lev, The Law of VicariousAdmissions-An Estoppel, 26 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 17, 28-29 (1957). Instead, the Advisory
Committee adopted the adversary theory. See infra pt. I(A)(2).
22. United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1975); see United
States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gil, 604
F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979). This rationale was suggested originally by Professor
Wigmore, see 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1080a, at 141 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as J. Wigmore II], and was adopted by the drafters of the Model Code of
Evidence, Model Code of Evidence Rule 508 comment b at 251 (1942) (Conspirator
"statements are likely to be true, and are usually made with a realization that they
are against the declarant's interest.").
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rationale-a coconspirator's statements are authorized by all other
coconspirators;2 3 (3) the necessity rationale-a coconspirator's statements are such essential evidence that they should be admitted despite
their flaws. 24 Although none of these rationales is universally accepted, each has been applied to the collateral conspiracy issue. 25 A
thorough evaluation of each is therefore warranted.
1. The Trustworthiness Rationale
The trustworthiness rationale suggests that coconspirator state-

ments are inherently reliable and therefore should be admitted despite
the lack of the usual in-court guarantors of reliability. 26 This view
likens the coconspirator exception to the declaration against interest
exception.2 7 The latter exception admits hearsay statements contrary
to the declarant's interest on the theory that a reasonable person

would not make such statements unless they were true. 28 Because all

conspirators are deemed to share a joint interest, any statement made
during the course of the conspiracy that is against the interest of any

conspirator is considered to be against the joint interest of all conspira-

23. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974); United States v.
Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); see Van Riper v. United States,
13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926); J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-168 to -169. This is the "classical"
rationale for the coconspirator exception. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3,
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-168 to -169; Levie, supra note 9, at 1163. The exception
has its origins in United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469-70 (1827)
(statements of agent admissible against principle in criminal case).
24. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1981); 4 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169; Levie, supra
note 9, at 1166; see United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.25 (2d
Cir. 1979) (dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980). This rationale was first
espoused by Professor Levie, who found the trustworthiness and agency rationales
unconvincing. Levie, supra note 9, at 1166.
25. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying trustworthiness rationale to collateral conspiracy); United States v. Layton, 549
F. Supp. 903, 917-18 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (applying agency and necessity rationales to
collateral conspiracy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
26. See United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d
764, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1975); Model Code of Evidence Rule 508 comment b at 251
(1942); 4 J. Wigmore II, supra note 22, § 1080a, at 141; Levie, supra note 9, at 1165.
27. See Model Code of Evidence Rule 508b comment at 252-53 (1942); R.
Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 365, 366-67; 4 J. Wigmore II, supra note
22, § 1080a, at 141; Levie, supra note 9, at 1163.
28. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) is the modern version of the declaration against
interest exception. It provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: . . . (3) Statement against interest. A statement
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tors. 21 Such a statement therefore is considered reliable ° and can be
admitted against any of the conspirators.
The trustworthiness rationale is not a legitimate basis for the modern coconspirator exception. 3 1 First, the premise of inherent reliability

upon which the rationale rests is unsound. 32 The declaration against

interest analogy fails to distinguish between declarations showing that
the declarant is a member of a conspiracy and declarations showing
the conspiracy's aims and membership . 33 A conspirator's statement
will usually be reliable to establish the existence of a conspiracy
because it is often against the declarant's interest to make such a
statement. 34 A conspirator-declarant's interest is likely to be advanced, however, by deceiving his listener with inaccurate statements
35 Such stateconcerning the aims and membership of the conspiracy.
36
reliable.
considered
ments therefore should not be

which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary.. . interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true.
Id.; see Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Toney, 599 F.2d 787, 789-90 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285,
288-89 (5th Cir. 1978). It is significant that the declaration against interest exception,
unlike the coconspirator exception, requires the declarant to be unavailable. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (requires declarant unavailability) with Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) (2) (E) (applicable regardless of declarant's availability).
29. Levie, supra note 9, at 1165; see United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126,
130-31 (2d Cir. 1974); 4 J. Wigmore II, supra note 22, § 1080a, at 143.
30. See United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d
764, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.
1974); Model Code of Evidence Rule 508 comment b at 251 (1942); 4 J. Wigmore II,
supra note 22, § 1080a, at 143-44.
31. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.25 (2d Cir. 1979)
(dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp.
903, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee note; Levie, supra note 9, at 1165-66.
32. See C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 262, at 628-29; 4 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-171; Levie, supra note 9, at 1165;
Morgan I, supra note 12, 470-71; Strahorn, supra note 16, at 573, 576.
33. Levie, supra note 9, at 1165.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1165-66; see, e.g., United States v. Piccolo, 696 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th
Cir. 1983) (statement made to alleviate drug buyer's fears), vacated on other
grounds, 705 F.2d 800 (1983); United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1268-70 (9th
Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 534 (8th Cir.) (statement
made to recruit new member), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
36. Levie, supra note 9, at 1165-66.
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Second, the requirement that a statement be made in furtherance of
the 37
conspiracy is unnecessary if the rationale for the Rule is reliability. Merely narrative statements may also be against the joint interest of the conspirators.3 8 Such statements are excluded under the
modern exception, however, because they do not satisfy the "in furtherance" requirement of the Rule. 39 Under the trustworthiness rationale, therefore, the "in furtherance" requirement is merely an arbitrary limitation on the scope of the exception. 40 Assuming the drafters
intended this requirement to have conceptual significance, 4' its inclusion manifests their rejection of the trustworthiness rationale.
The legislative history of the Rule further undermines reliance on
this rationale. The Federal Rules classify the coconspirator exception
37. Significantly, the drafters of the Model Code of Evidence Rule 508 (1942),
who adopted the trustworthiness rationale, did not include the "in furtherance"
requirement. Id. & comment a at 250. The exception under the Model Code admits
all statements relating to the conspiracy provided they were made during its pendencv. Id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1983)
(prosecution of defendants for illegally using their influence to obtain bank charters
for others; statement by one defendant that conspirators would charge $25,000 for a
particular charter held not in furtherance of conspiracy); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp.,
673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982) (private antitrust suit; statement by defendant that
he intended to conspire to cut off plaintiff held not in furtherance of conspiracy);
United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (trial for
drug offenses; statements by defendant to common-law wife regarding membership
of conspiracy held not in furtherance of conspiracy).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1983);
Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878,
883 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. Cf. Levie, supra note 9, at 1167 (discussing necessity rationale; agency
rules-including "in furtherance" requirement-arbitrary). The "in furtherance"
limitation makes conceptual sense only under the agency rationale because it is
analogous to the limitation that an agent's statement is admissible only if made
within the scope of his authority. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 & n.6
(1974); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 578 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979); Carl Wagner & Sons v. Appendagez, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 762, 773-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Levie, supra note 9, at 1167. Professor Levie notes that the "in
furtherance" requirement is often retained by common-law courts adopting the
necessity rationale to provide additional, though arbitrary, protection to defendants
from the dangers of unreliable hearsay. Levie, supra note 9, at 1166-67. Under the
trustworthiness rationale, however, coconspirator statements are considered inherently reliable. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. It is difficult, therefore,
to envision the purpose of the "in furtherance" requirement under the latter rationale.
41. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant." 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.06, at 63 (4th ed. 1973); accord United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); see In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346,
1362 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting C. Sands, supra); Donaldson, Hoffman & Goldstein
v. Gaudio, 260 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1958).
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as an admission by a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2). 42 The
Advisory Committee Note to that Rule indicates that the Committee

did not base the exceptions of that Rule on a rationale of trustworthiness: "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category
of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the
result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions
of the hearsay rule. No43guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the
case of an admission."
2. The Criminal Agency Rationale
The criminal agency rationale for the coconspirator exception is an
extension of the adversary theory, 44 which is the basis for all the
admission exceptions. 45 The a:dversary theory begins with the idea that
it is fair to admit a party's own statement against him. 46 A party is
estopped from objecting to the absence of the traditional judicial
checks of reliability when his statements are voluntarily made. 47 He
"can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under
sanction of an oath." 48 Moreover, the party retains the right to take
the stand in his own behalf and explain or deny the statement. 49
This theory also supports the admission of statements made by a
party's agent during the pendency and within the scope of his authority.5 0 The criminal agency rationale suggests that coconspirators are

42. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
43. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note (citations omitted).
44. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 344 (1983); see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note; D. Binder,
Hearsay Handbook § 28.13, at 366-67 (2d ed. 1983); Lev, supra note 21, at 29-30,
39-40.
45. Fed. R. Eviid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note; D. Binder, supra note 44,
§ 28.13, at 366; R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 16, § 262, at 366; C.
McCormick, supra note 3, § 262, at 628-29; E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 266; see
Lev, supra note 21, at 28-29.
46. See D. Binder, supra note 44, § 28.13, at 366; E. Morgan, supra note 21, at
266; Lev, supra note 21, at 29.
47. 2 C. Chamberlayne, The Modern Law of Evidence § 1292, at 1636 (1911);
see E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 266; Lev, supra note 21, at 29-30.
48. E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 266.
49. D. Binder, supra note 44, § 28.13, at 366; E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 266;
see 2 C. Chamberlayne, supra note 47, § 1292, at 1636.
50. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note; D. Binder, supra note
44, § 28.13, at 366-67; E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 272-73; Lev, supra note 21, at
42-45.
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the criminal equivalent of co-agents. 51 The act of joining the conspiracy therefore constitutes authorization of all statements made during
52
the pendency and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The structure and background of Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) suggest that the
criminal agency rationale was influential in the formation of the rule.
The "in furtherance" requirement is analogous to the requirement of
Rule 801(d) (2) (D) that an agent's statement be within the scope of the
agent's employment.5 3 Both requirements seek to ensure that the
party-opponent authorized the declarant's statement.5 4 Furthermore,
the rule is classified as an admission, and the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 801 specifically provides that the adversary rationale
supports all the admission exceptions. 55 Most significantly, the Committee Note to Rule 801(d) (2) (E) expressly refers to the "agency theory
of conspiracy. "5
The criminal agency rationale is not conceptually persuasive. It is a
fiction;57 the nature of criminal conspiracies belies the claim that
conspirators authorize or ratify each other's statements.58 A particular
coconspirator may not know the actual scope and membership of the
conspiracy of which he is a part, nor even its intended goal.5 9 The

51. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974); United States v.
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United
States v. Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir.
1981).
52. E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 275; Lev, supra note 21, at 40; Comment, The
Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators'Declarations,25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 530, 53839 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HearsayException]; see Van Riper v. United States, 13
F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
53. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974); United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 578 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Carl
Wagner & Sons v. Appendagez, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 762, 773-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Levie, supra note 9. at 1167.
54. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169 to
-171; see E. Morgan, supra note 21, at 275; Lev, supra note 21, at 40.
55. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
56. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.
57. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 917 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423
(1984); Fed. T . Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.
58. Hearsay Exception, supra note 52, at 539-42; see Levie, supra note 9, at
1165.
59. Klein, supra note 9, at 8; Hearsay Exception, supra note 52, at 539; cf.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946) (conspirator responsible for
offenses of other conspirators even when not aware of offenses); United States v.
Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979);
United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 187 (9th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 854 (1974).
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elements of control and supervision, so evident in a civil agency
60
situation, therefore are lacking in a criminal conspiracy.
3. The Necessity Rationale
The necessity rationale suggests that the coconspirator exception

exists because of the great need for the evidence in proving the crime

of conspiracy.6 1 Under this view, the pendency and furtherance requirements are arbitrary limitations on the scope of the exception that
were intended to meet the countervailing
need to protect defendants
62
from the dangers of hearsay.
The necessity rationale is most persuasive when a charged conspiracy serves as the basis of admissibility.6 3 Even then, however, it is not
without flaws. Although coconspirator statements may be necessary to
prove the crime of conspiracy, the prosecutor must prove the existence
of the conspiracy with evidence other than the hearsay statement at
issue before he can introduce the coconspirator statements.6 4 The
hearsay statements therefore are not the only evidence available to
prove the conspiracy. 6 Of course, proving the conspiracy to the judge

for admissibility purposes usually requires independent evidence

meeting a preponderance standard, 66 while proving the crime of con-

60. See Hearsay Exception, supra note 52, at 539; Note, The Coconspirator
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The Limits of its Logic, 37 La. L. Rev. 1101, 1106
(1977) [hereinafter cited as CoconspiratorException].
61. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1981); 4 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169; Levie, supra
note 9, at 1166; Hearsay Exception, supra note 52, at 540-41.
62. United States v. Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d
446 (10th Cir. 1981); see 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3,
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169 to -171; Levie, supra note 9, at 1167.
63. See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1981);
Levie, supra note 9, at 1166.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 621 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (1st Cir.
1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 999 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Baykowski, 615 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1357-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
833 (1979); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
65. See Hearsay Exception, supra note 52, at 540-41; CoconspiratorException,
supra note 60, at 1108.
66. See e.g., United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165, 1167-68, 1168 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Thompson, Inc., 621 F.2d 1147, 1153 & n.8 (1st Cir.
1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1000 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Baykowski, 615 F.2d 767, 770-71 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1356-57 (7th
Cir.) (Pell, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Jones,
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spiracy to the jury requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt . 7 Nevertheless, it is perhaps too strong to say that conspirator statements are
always necessary to prove conspiracy.
When an uncharged conspiracy serves as the basis of admissibility,
the necessity rationale falls of its own weight. When there is no need
to prove the conspiracy to the jury, the admission of coconspirator
statements cannot be justified on this basis. The necessity rationale
therefore does not support even the established admissibility of statements from underlying conspiracies. Certainly, this rationale cannot,
by itself, support extension of the coconspirator exception to include
collateral conspiracies.
B. Application of the Rationales to Collateral Conspiracies
Collateral conspirator statements are not within the established
scope of the coconspirator exception; 68 there is no mention of them in
the legislative history of the Rule,69 nor was the issue addressed by the
courts prior to the Rule's enactment.7 0 The drafters of Rule
801(d)(2)(E), however, expressly intended to admit only those statements within the scope of the exception at the time the Rule was
adopted. 71 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, prior to the adoption of
the Federal Rules, indicated that the coconspirator exception should
be limited: "We have consistently refused to broaden that very narrow
exception to the traditional hearsay rule which admits statements of a

542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970). See
generally Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit Courts' Application of the
CoconspiratorException, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 125, 137-46 (1982) (comparing
different standards of proof used by federal circuits). To date, no circuit has adopted
a standard as high as beyond a reasonable doubt, although it has been suggested. 1 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 104[05], at 104-44.
67. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361,
364 (1970).
68. See United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
69. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note; S. Rep. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7073;
H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7075, 7086; H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7103-04.
70. See United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 916-17 (N.D. Cal. 1982),
ajf'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
71. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.

946

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

codefendant made in furtherance of a conspiracy or joint undertaking."'72 A broad construction therefore should not be adopted lightly.
1. The Trustworthiness Rationale-A Broad Construction
In United States v. Coppola,73 the Tenth Circuit adopted a broad
construction of the coconspirator exception and allowed a collateral
conspiracy to serve as the basis of admissibility. 74 This holding was
necessitated by the court's adoption of the unsound and inapplicable
trustworthiness rationale. 75 If coconspirator statements are viewed as
inherently reliable, it makes no difference that such statements were
made during the course and in furtherance of a collateral conspiracy
as opposed to a charged or underlying conspiracy.7 6 Statements of a
coconspirator made in the course of any collateral conspiracy, no
with the charged or underlying
matter how attenuated the connection
77
conspiracy, will be admitted.
The Coppola decision illustrates the problematic results of this
broad interpretation of the rule. In Coppola, the defendant was
charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 7s Both the
defendant and the murder victim were shown to have been members
of a collateral drug conspiracy. 79 Allegedly, the victim, rather than
delivering a drug shipment as he had agreed with the defendant,
retained a portion of the shipment for his personal benefit.80 In an
attempt to establish the defendant's motive for the murder,8 1 the
prosecution sought to admit statements of the victim that were made
during the course and in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. 82 The
court held that the statements were admissible under the coconspira72. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963).
73. 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 770.
75. See id. at 770-71.
76. See id. at 770.
77. Although such statements theoretically may be excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
403, reliance on this Rule would be ill-founded. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
78. 526 F.2d at 766-67.
79. Id. at 770.
80. Id. at 766-67.
81. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith." Such evidence, however, is potentially admissible for other
purposes, including "proof of motive." Id. The trial judge determines admissibility
based upon the factors set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 403. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory
committee note; S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprintedin 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7071; 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 5240, at 471 (1978). See infra note 101.
82. 526 F.2d at 766-67, 770. Significantly, the prosecution could not argue that
this conspiracy was an underlying conspiracy because it was highly unlikely that the
victim was a conspirator to his own murder.
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tor exception. 83 Thus, potentially unreliable statements, only remotely
connected to the issues at trial, came before the jury.
The Tenth Circuit's broad construction of the exception to include
collateral conspiracies usurps the "in furtherance" requirement of the
Rule. The prosecution is permitted to introduce statements that were
not made in furtherance of any conspiracy related to the substantive
charge merely because they were made in furtherance of some conspiracy. As the construction of conspiracy becomes broader, the "in
furtherance" requirement becomes less meaningful and is readily manipulated by creative prosecutors. 84 Such a construction is inconsistent
with the intended scope of the coconspirator exception:
The adoption of Rule 801(d) (2) (E) and the rejection of the Model
Code-Uniform Rule approach should be viewed as mandating a
construction of the "in furtherance" requirement protective of defendants, particularly since the Advisory Committee was concerned lest relaxation of this standard lead to the admission of less
reliable evidence. 85

2. The Criminal Agency and Necessity Rationales-A Narrow Construction
The true foundation of the modern coconspirator exception is apparently a combination of the criminal agency rationale and the
necessity rationale.88 The great need for this evidence is most probably
the practical reason for the exception, 87 while the criminal agency

83. Id. at 770.
84. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979), illustrates the risk of manipulation of the requirements created by a broad
construction of the Rule. In Postal, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to
import marijuana. Id. at 865. The prosecution sought to admit the logbook from the
defendants' ship, which contained statements by one or more unidentified persons
making the voyage. Id. at 866 & n.41. Although there was insufficient independent
evidence of the criminal conspiracy, the court admitted the evidence. Id. at 866 n.41.
The court identified the voyage itself as a non-criminal joint venture. Id. On the basis
of this collateral joint venture, the court admitted hearsay that could not be shown
by a preponderance of evidence to have been made in the course or in furtherance of
a charged or underlying conspiracy.
85. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-173.
86. See United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.25 (2d Cir.
1979) (dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Layton, 549 F.
Supp. 903, 917-18 (N.D. Cal. 1982), afj'd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds, 720
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); United States v. Stipe,
517 F. Supp. 867, 868-69 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1981); 4 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-168 to -171.
87. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169;
Levie, supra note 9, at 1166.
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theory is the means of rationalizing it."' As demonstrated above,8 the
necessity rationale alone cannot be relied on to support an extension of
the exception to include collateral conspiracies. It simply does not
apply to statements from uncharged conspiracies. If the exception is to
be extended to admit collateral conspirator statements, it must be
through an extension of the criminal agency rationale.
In United States v. Layton,9 0 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California applied the criminal agency and
necessity rationales to a collateral conspiracy. In Layton, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder."' Both the defendant and his alleged coconspirator in the murder conspiracy were
shown to have been members of a broader conspiracy to conceal a
wide range of illicit activities. 92 This cover-up conspiracy was not
charged in the indictment. 93 The prosecution sought to admit statements made by the defendant's coconspirator in furtherance of the
broad cover-up conspiracy, but not in furtherance of the murder
conspiracy. 94 The court held the statements inadmissible because they
were not made in furtherance of a charged or underlying conspiracy.

95

The Layton court noted that the coconspirator exception, "[u]nlike
many other exceptions to the hearsay rule, . . . is not based upon the
inherent reliability of [the] statements. Rather, it is based on the legal
fiction of [criminal] agency . .. supported by the realization that

88. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(E)[011, at 801-168 to
-170; see Levie, supra note 9, at 1163.
89. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
90. 549 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
91. Id. at 906.
92. Id. at 916.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 918. The statements in question were in one of four groups of statements the prosecution sought to admit. 720 F.2d at 554-55; 549 F. Supp. at 907. This
group was designated "[statements by] Jim Jones to the members of the Peoples
Temple shortly before and during the mass suicide at Jonestown, commonly known
as the 'Last Hour Tape.' " 549 F. Supp. at 907; accord 720 F.2d at 561. The
prosecution offered seven different grounds for admitting the statements, including
the declaration against penal interest exception of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), 549 F.
Supp. at 914, and the coconspirator exception of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), id. at
915-16. Although the district court held that the statements were declarations against
penal interest, it excluded them because they did not satisfy the reliability requirement of the confrontation clause. Id. at 914. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the confrontation clause was
satisfied and the statements were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). 720 F.2d at 56263. The circuit court did not address the collateral conspiracy issue.
95. 549 F. Supp. at 918.
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without such evidence it would be difficult to prove conspiracy."' 6
The court concluded that these rationales "suggest" a narrow construction of the exception regarding collateral conspiracies.9 7 Such a
construction "will result in the inclusion of co-conspirator statements
relating directly to the criminal conspiracy in question, and the exclusion of a broader swath of potentially unreliable testimony. 98 The
court relied primarily on the Advisory Committee Note to
801(d) (2) (E), which states: "[T]he agency theory of conspiracy is at
best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond
that already established."' 9
The analysis in Layton is preferable to that in Coppola. The Layton
court's narrow construction mandated that the prosecution show the
statement in question was made in furtherance of a charged or underlying conspiracy. 0 0 By starting with the legitimate rationales for the
rule, the Layton court arrived at a narrow construction of the exception that best gives substance to the "in furtherance" requirement.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. Policies Underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence
Two pertinent policies that underlie the Federal Rules of Evidence
are: (1) minimization of confusion and waste in the evidentiary process; and (2) exclusion of prejudicial evidence.10 ' A narrow construction
of the coconspirator exception serves these policies by eliminating both
the procedural burdens involved in determining the admissibility of
statements and the inherently prejudicial statecollateral conspirator
02
ments themselves.'
Before a coconspirator statement may be admitted under Rule
801(d)(2) (E), the prosecutor must prove the existence and member96. Id. at 917-18 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 918.
98. Id.
99. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.
100. 549 F. Supp. at 917.
101. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note; Dolan, supra note 13, at 226.
Fed. R. Evid. 102 requires that the rules "be construed to secure fairness in administration [and] elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay ... to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Similarly, Fed. R.
Evid. 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 81, § 5212, at
250 n.1 (1978) ("[T]he importance of Rule 403 in the scheme of the rules.. . has led
some to refer to it as 'the cornerstone' on which the rules are built.").
102. See United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.25 (2d Cir.
1979) (dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Layton, 549 F.
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ship of the conspiracy by independent evidence. 0 3 When a collateral
conspiracy is the basis for admission, however, much if not all of the
evidence required to prove the collateral conspiracy is irrelevant to the
issues at trial. 10 4 The inquiry into collateral issues required to deter-

mine admissibility therefore may result in an inordinate consumption

of time and resources. 10 5 In addition, the Second Circuit has noted
that such an inquiry might confuse the trial judge regarding the
distinction between relevant trial evidence and irrelevant evidence

relating only to the existence of a collateral conspiracy.'" 6

Moreover, collateral conspirator statements often are highly prejudicial to the defendant because they point out his involvement in a
conspiracy or crime not charged in the case at trial. 0 7 Evidence of a
defendant's prior crimes is usually scrutinized under Rule 404(b), 0 8
which requires a Rule 403 balancing of the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect. 0 9 Collateral conspirator statements, however, are more dangerous than typical prior crimes evidence; these statements are potentially unreliable as well as prejudicial. Rules 404(b) and 403 therefore are insufficient protection against
this unique danger.
A narrow construction of the exception is a superior method of
protecting against the admission of these prejudicial statements. Rule
403, by its terms, favors admissibility of probative evidence; it will not
exclude prejudicial statements unless the danger of prejudice substan-

Supp. 903, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1982), af-f'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 720
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
103. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 279 (2d Cir.) ("proferred evidence
seems ...

collateral and of doubtful probative value"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982

(1973); Corey v. United States, 346 F.2d 65, 67 (1st Cir.) (collateral evidence was
properly rejected as "insufficiently probative"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965);
United States v. Wilson, 490 F. Supp. 713, 719 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (extrinsic
evidence which is highly probative is "therefore, not 'collateral' "), aff'd, 639 F.2d
314 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942 (1981); Dolan, supra note 13, at 264
("[s]ome use collateralness to denote immateriality or irrelevancy").
105. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 636 n.25 (2d Cir. 1979)
(dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); see Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 783
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); Dolan, supra note 13, at 262.
106. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 636 n.25 (2d Cir. 1979)
(dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980).
107. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (evidence of
crimes not charged inherently prejudicial); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,
910 (5th Cir. 1978) (same). See supra note 81.
108. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
109. See supra note 81.
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tially outweighs their probative value."10 Moreover, even when this
high standard is met, Rule 403 does not mandate exclusion-the trial
judge, within his discretion, may still admit the evidence."' Finally,
reliance on Rules 404(b) and 403 to determine the admissibility of
collateral conspirator statements will require a case-by-case inquiry
into collateral issues of fact, increasing the potential for confusion or
waste. 1 2 If a class of potentially unreliable statements is inherently
prejudicial, it is not sound policy to rely on a pro-admission case-bycase analysis to determine whether such prejudice exists in sufficient
force to warrant exclusion."3
B. The Confrontation Clause, the CoconspiratorException
and CollateralConspiracies
The relationship between the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment and the hearsay rule has long been a topic of discus15
sion. 1 4 They are derived from the same roots;" the foundation of

110. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra
note 81, § 5221, at 308 (1978).
111. S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 107, at 101; 22 C. Wright & K.
Graham, supra note 81, § 5221, at 309; see Farage, Critique of Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1970 A.B.A. Sec. Ins., Neg. & Comp. L. 433, 436. The trial
court's decision may be reversed only if there is an abuse of this discretion. United
States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531,
537-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Calhoun, 544
F.2d 291, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1976).
112. See United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 636 n.25 (2d Cir.
1979) (dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); cf. Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 355 (1959) (should "avoid needless trial of collateral and confusing issues");
Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (inquiry into collateral issues
a "waste of time"); United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); Dolan, supra note 13, at 262 ("evidence
that is remote or collateral can . . . confuse the issues . . . or consume too much
time").
113. See United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 740 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 832 (1974).
114. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 10, at 1405 (case-by-case approach); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful Witness, 56
Tex. L. Rev. 151, 204-05 (1978) (favors relaxed standard); Read, The New Confrontation-HearsayDilemma, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1972) (case-by-case approach);
Seidelson, HearsayExceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 76,
91-92 (1971) (pro-defendant approach); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1203 (1979) (favors relaxed standard); The Supreme Court, 1967
Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 236-37 (1968) (pro-defendant approach).
115. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970); see California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155 (1970).
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both is the need to exclude unreliable out-of-court statements and
preserve the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.1 16 The hearsay
rule, however, is applicable in both civil and criminal cases,' 1 7 while
the confrontation clause is applicable only when the evidence is introduced against a criminal defendant." 8 The Supreme Court has made
clear that the confrontation clause extends beyond the scope of the
hearsay rule." 9 If it is determined that a hearsay statement is admissible under an exception, the statement
must still clear this second
120
hurdle before it can be admitted.

The test for admissibility of a hearsay statement under the confrontation clause is set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.'2 ' The test, which presumes the statement's inclusion within an enumerated hearsay exception, 12 2 has two requirements. First, the proponent of the statement
must produce any available witnesses, unless producing the witness
would be of remote utility. 2 3 Second, there must be sufficient indicia

that the statement is reliable. 2 4 If the statement is within a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception, 25 such indicia of reliability may be presumed.

61

If not, the court may admit the statement only if it passes a

12 7
particularized inquiry into its reliability.
The first requirement of the Roberts test is satisfied if the prosecution shows that the declarant is unavailable. 2 8 Alternatively, if the
evidence appears reliable and is relatively insignificant, the prosecution is relieved of its obligation to produce the declarant. 2 9 Once the

116. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Fed.
R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note.
117. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(b). "These rules apply generally to civil actions and
proceedings [and] to criminal cases and proceedings ...." Id.
118. U.S. Const. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right

. . .

to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... Id.

119. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
80-82 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1970).
120. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
80-82 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1970).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
122. Id. at 65.
123. Id. at 65 & n.7.
124. Id. at 65-66.
125. Id. at 66.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir.
1981), vacated in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 404 (1983).
129. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 87, 89 (1970); United States v. Gibbs, No. 82-1096, slip op. at 20-21 (3d Cir.
1983).
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prosecution satisfies this requirement, the issue becomes whether there

are sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the second Roberts requirement.
Some courts have categorized the coconspirator exception as a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception. 130 Consequently, these courts have

held without further inquiry that statements within the exception

satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.13 ' Other courts,
recognizing that the coconspirator exception is not premised on reliability, have concluded that a particularized reliability inquiry is re-

quired to determine if statements within the exception satisfy the
Roberts test. 132 Regardless of the view espoused, important policy
considerations mandate a narrow construction of the coconspirator

exception.
If a court accepts the coconspirator exception as firmly rooted,
coconspirator statements within the scope of the exception automatically pass through the confrontation clause analysis on a mere pre-

sumption of reliability. 33 Extending the coconspirator exception beyond its established scope13 4 to include collateral conspiracies

therefore would also extend the presumption of reliability that does
1 35
not reflect the true nature of coconspirator statements. The cocon130. United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have
equated satisfaction of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) with satisfaction of the confrontation clause without expressly finding the exception "firmly rooted." See United States
v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982);
United States v. Burroughs, 650 F.2d 595, 597 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1037 (1981); United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978).
In United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975), the Tenth Circuit did
not undertake a separate reliability inquiry after determining that the collateral
conspirator statement was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). See id. at
769-70. Three years after Coppola, the Tenth Circuit held that a particularized
reliability inquiry was necessary before admitting statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979).
131. See United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170 n.5 (6th Cir.
1978).
132. See United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983);
United States v. Singer, 660 F.2d 1295, 1307 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1156 (1982); United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979). In Ammar, the Third Circuit held that Rule
801(d)(2)(E) could not be considered a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" because it is
technically not an exception. 714 F.2d at 255 (emphasis in original).
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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spirator exception should not lightly be extended when it may undermine a fundamental pillar of constitutional protection.
For those courts that undertake a particularized reliability inquiry,
the narrow construction of the exception provides a fundamentally

better method of dealing with the collateral conspiracy issue. When
there are no independent indicia of a collateral conspirator's statement's reliability, a narrow construction of the exception allows a
court to avoid basing the statement's inadmissibility on broad consti136
tutional grounds.
If particular collateral conspirator statements do appear reliable,
they are potentially admissible under Rule 803(24) 137 or Rule
804(b) (5) .138 These Rules provide for the admission of hearsay state136. Cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (desirable to avoid basing decision on constitutional grounds); McElroy v.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283 (1960) (same); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331
U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947) (same); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (same).
137. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: ...
...A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Hearsay may be admitted under Rule 803(24) "despite having failed the requirements of one of the other exceptions . . . . [T]he residual exceptions are not dependent on the other exceptions for their meaning." In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Litig.,
723 F.2d 238, 302 (3d Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581, 58384 (7th Cir. 1984) (prison report inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); admissible
under Rule 803(24)); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (9th Cir.
1982) (bank reports inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); admissible under Rule
803(24)); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1237, 1238-39,
1241-42 (D.D.C. 1981) (reports inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B);
admissible under Rule 803(24)).
Federal courts differ as to their enforcement of the notice requirement. Compare
United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1980) (strictly enforced) and
United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (same) and United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (same) with United States v.
Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (lack of notice not determinative unless
prejudicial to defendant) and United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir.
1976) (requirement "should not be an inflexible and imposing barrier"), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977).
138. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). This Rule is identical to Fed. R. Evid. 803(24)
except it requires the declarant to be unavailable. This difference, however, may be
merely textual.
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ments that do not fall within an enumerated exception but do have
equivalent indicia of reliability.139 Of course, the court in a criminal
case must still measure such statements against the Roberts standard.1 40 This constitutional inquiry, however, is mandated whenever
a hearsay statement is admitted in a criminal trial.'41 Therefore, in the
rare case when a collateral conspirator statement is reliable, it can be
admitted without broadening the scope of the coconspirator exception. Collateral conspirator statements that are unreliable, however,
can be excluded without unduly invoking constitutional grounds.
CONCLUSION

Collateral conspiracies should not be permitted to serve as the basis
of admissibility under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Allowing collateral conspirator statements to be admitted involves an
unnecessary extension of the exception without any theoretical or
practical justification. Such an extension would provide for the admission of a new group of potentially unreliable coconspirator statements
and thereby further unbalance an already one-sided exception.
A narrow construction of the exception is more in line with the
exception's true rationales and best satisfies the dictates of its statutory

Despite the fact that the heading of Rule 803 indicates that it covers hearsay
exceptions where the availability of a declarant is immaterial, the fact that
Rule 803(24) requires a Court to look at the availability of other evidence
that can be produced in Court signifies that the availability of a declarant
may be important when the residual hearsay exception is invoked.
S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 107, at 585; see United States v. Mathis, 559
F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977) (declarant available; hearsay not admissible under
803(24) because "live testimony ... more probative"). It has been suggested that
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) is meaningless because of Rule 803(24). D. Binder, supra
note 44, § 40.05, at 446.
139. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5); see United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d
109, 118-19 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 69-70 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665
F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982). Courts differ regarding
whether the reliability inquiry should consider the reliability of the in-court witness
who reports the statement. Compare United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d
Cir. 1978) (considers reporting witness reliability) and United States v. Medico, 557
F.2d 309, 315-16 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977) with Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979) (does not consider reliability
of reporting witness).
140. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980); see, e.g., United States v.
Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d
308, 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Peacock,
654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1982).
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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language. In addition, this construction is mandated by important
evidentiary and constitutional policies. Finally, the narrow construction of the coconspirator exception does not preclude the admission of
truly reliable collateral conspirator statements.
Of course, under a narrow construction of the exception, a prosecutor may be tempted to charge any conspiracy that may provide coconspirator statements useful in the principal case. As one court noted,
however, "careful trial court supervision, coupled with proper appellate review, should be sufficient to guard against this event."' 42 A
narrow construction, when combined with close scrutiny by the
courts and the good faith exercise of prosecutorial discretion, will
confine a potentially oppressive hearsay exception to the fair and
efficient use for which it was intended.
David Calabrese

142. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 636 n.25 (2d Cir. 1979)
(dictum), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980).

